Using the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) , we …nd that market risk is not a priced factor of expected fund returns when investor sentiment is positive. However, when sentiment is negative, the market risk premium becomes signi…cant. We then analyze the performance of fund investors in the cross-section of market risk. We …nd that smart investors seem aware that funds'alphas do not vary with the state of sentiment, even though sentiment leads to patterns of funds'returns in excess of the market. Another key …nding is that smart investors prefer the safest funds. The e¤ects we document are economically signi…cant: a trading strategy which is long in the positive cash ‡ow portfolio and short in the negative cash ‡ow portfolio yields an annualized alpha of 3.72 percent for the group of safest funds even after controlling for size, book-to-market and momentum.
I. Introduction
We …nd that risk is only a priced factor of expected equity mutual fund returns when investor sentiment is negative. However, when sentiment is positive, risk is not priced and the risk premium becomes insigni…cant. This striking relation holds for both total risk and market risk as measured by market beta while controlling for other well known risk factors.
When we analyze the performance of fund investors in the cross-section, we …nd that investors buy equity funds which outperform and sell funds which underperform the average mutual fund the next month, but only for the group of safest funds.
One of our key …ndings is thus that "smart money" prefers funds which have the lowest exposure to the market as measured by market beta. While investor sentiment leads to patterns in the cross-section of funds'returns in excess of the market, smart investors seem aware that funds'alphas do not vary with the state of sentiment. Still, their trading activity leads to statistically and economically signi…cant e¤ects. For example, a trading strategy which is long in the positive cash ‡ow portfolio and short in the negative cash ‡ow portfolio yields an alpha of 31 bps per month or 3.72 percent per year for the safest funds. All these e¤ects are short-lived and do not exist for longer holding periods than one month.
Our results contribute to two di¤erent strands of literature, the "smart money" e¤ect and investor sentiment. It has long been hypothesized that fund investors are smart in the sense that they invest in funds which subsequently outperform and similarly disinvest from funds which subsequently underperform. This "smart money" e¤ect is still under debate as literature has shown mixed evidence (Gruber (1996) , Zheng (1999) , Sapp and Tiwari (2004) , or Keswani and Stolin (2008) ). With mutual fund ‡ows being nothing more than new investments into the fund market or a shift of existing investments, we are able to observe the behavior of many investors directly and hence gain some insights on investors'trading decisions and realized returns. We shed further light on this issue as little is known whether investors prefer safer or riskier funds.
We contribute to the literature by exploring the relation between expected returns and risk for fund investors. Another stream of the literature argues that investor sentiment a¤ects the cross-section of stock returns. Baker and Wurgler (2006) use several market proxies to build a sentiment index and …nd that the extreme deciles of certain characteristic-sorted stock portfolios are related to their index. However, they do not show that sentiment is a priced risk factor. Unlike Baker and Wurgler (2006) , we do not use the precise level of sentiment itself but whether the index is positive or negative. We do not show that sentiment is a priced risk factor but our result is far more subtle as the relation between expected returns and market risk is time-varying, and strongly depends on the state of sentiment. Our study is related to Yuan and Yu (2011) who use two di¤erent market indices to show that the meanvariance relation in equity markets only holds during negative sentiment periods. During positive sentiment periods, the relation is essentially ‡at and, as a result, investors are not compensated for risk. We hypothesize that smart fund investors should disinvest from the group of riskier funds if they do not receive a risk premium and if investors just care about outperforming the market and not alpha performance. Note that unlike Yuan and Yu (2011) we investigate the cross-section of assets which allows us to conduct a formal asset pricing test using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982) . We o¤er an additional insight about market conditions as market and equity fund returns show signi…cant autocorrelation during positive sentiment but none during negative sentiment periods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we review the studies mentioned above in more detail and in section III we develop our main hypotheses. Section IV describes the data used, section V shows the empirical methods employed, and section VI shows our results. We conclude in section VII.
II. Literature
As mentioned in the introduction, the "smart money" e¤ect is so far under dispute as the evidence is mixed. The …rst to address mutual fund investors'selection ability was Gruber (1996) . He …nds that money ‡ows to funds, which subsequently on average outperform, even after controlling for risk. Thus, investors appear to be smart. Zheng (1999) …nds that especially small funds entail a smart money e¤ect in the U.S. from 1970 to 1993. Sapp and Tiwari (2004) control for Carhart's (1997) momentum and …nd that the "smart money" e¤ect is completely explained by it, i.e. they …nd that returns earned by fund investors do not outperform the average mutual fund in the U.S. from 1970 to 2000. While chasing funds with high momentum loadings could still be considered smart, this is not the case for chasing past performance of funds. Since the authors …nd evidence for the latter but not for the former, they conclude that investors are not smart. Using monthly data for the U.S. and the U.K., Keswani and Stolin (2008) …nd again evidence for smart money. For the U.K., the authors …nd that both individual and institutional investors are smart regarding their buying but not their selling decisions. They then proceed to test U.S. data on the monthly and quarterly frequency and …nd that the …ndings of Sapp and Tiwari (2004) are due to their use of quarterly data and their weight on the pre-1991 period. Regardless of the momentum factor, Keswani and Stolin (2008) …nd that money seems to be "smart" in the U.S. after 1990.
While all these studies control for risk by using factor models, none of them analyzes expected returns in the cross-section. As mentioned in the introduction, recent empirical work tries to show that stocks which are hard to value or di¢ cult to arbitrage experience a correction of their mispricing (Glushkov (2007) ), which is prone to investor sentiment. Baker and Wurgler (2006) state that stocks which are highly subjective in terms of their valuations, will also be the riskiest and costliest to arbitrage. Thus, while the two e¤ects di¤er, the same group of stocks will most probably be a¤ected by both e¤ects. In particular, small market capitalization stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, unpro…table stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks are mostly related to lagged values of their index. Baker and Wurgler (2006) sort by just the aforementioned stock characteristics to construct portfolios long in one extreme decile and short in the op-posite decile. They then show that their sentiment index is a signi…cant regressor even after controlling for other risk factors. However, by using only the extreme deciles' long-short portfolio and not the entire cross-section of stocks'alphas, they fail to show that sentiment is a priced risk factor. In other words, there seems to be another risk factor which even conditional factor models (Ferson and Schadt (1996) ) do not fully account for, but only for a subgroup of stocks. In this paper, we follow a di¤erent path and do not try to include sentiment as an additional risk factor. One reason is that it seems unlikely that a fund's portfolio consists of only the aforementioned groups of stocks. Even if this were true for a part of the portfolio, the e¤ects might be diversi…ed away by the remaining stocks and sentiment might not be a priced risk factor. Still, the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) is very helpful to allow for time variation. Yuan and Yu (2011) show that the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) is even able to explain puzzles like the empirically not found mean-variance tradeo¤ of equity markets. They …nd that the mean-variance relation only holds during negative sentiment periods. Thus, there seems to be some evidence that sentiment in ‡uences the risk-return tradeo¤. The authors argue that during periods of positive sentiment, more sentiment-driven traders are active in …nancial markets, which results in mispricing of assets like the absence of the mean-variance tradeo¤. Additionally, those sentiment traders are reluctant to take short positions and can be expected to misestimate the variance of returns when sentiment is positive. Stambaugh et al. (2012) shed further light on the issue that short-sale constraints exist due to institutional constraints. For example 1 , mutual funds are in general not allowed to short-sell securities. In the presence of short-sale constraints, overpricing should occur more often than underpricing. This happens because securities with high prices are not brought back to their fundamental value, as less optimistic investors will take no positions instead of short positions. Although positive sentiment periods lead to overpricing and lower returns, the existence of short-sale constraints might strengthen the mispricing market anomalies, for which the authors …nd empirical evidence.
There is another study which links fund performance and the sentiment index. Using the sentiment index and fund portfolio holdings, Massa and Yadav (2012) 
III. Hypotheses
Many of the studies mentioned previously cite the seminal work of De Long et al. (1990) .
In their theoretical model, arbitrageurs may possibly not be willing to trade against market anomalies if noise traders create a speci…c market risk by their trading. Black (1986) introduces the concept of noise trading which is "trading on noise as if it were information" (p.
531). In other words, noise traders'demand for assets will be independent of their riskiness.
If risky assets are bought regardlessly, they will not o¤er a risk premium when demand is high, leading to our …rst hypothesis: when sentiment is positive, riskier stock funds do not o¤er a risk premium. If this hypothesis cannot be rejected, it means that non-noise traders will not receive a premium which they normally demand. If this "smart money" is represented by arbitrageurs or other well informed traders, we would expect them to sell if the number of noise traders becomes too large, or to switch to assets with lower risk. Similar to Yuan and Yu (2011) we refer to times with high activity of noise traders as positive sentiment periods. If "smart money" accepts the lower returns of safer assets, we could expect to see out ‡ows from the riskier group of funds into the safer group of funds when sentiment is positive and noise traders are active. Therefore, our second hypothesis is that "smart money" e¤ects appear for sell-decisions of riskier funds and purchase-based decisions of safer funds when sentiment is positive. In short: if riskier funds underperform relative to less risky funds, it is not smart to hold riskier funds. This hypothesis can be motivated only if "smart money" looks at raw fund returns. While Sirri and Tufano (1998) advocate that fund investors who are mainly individual households look at unadjusted returns, the "smart money" literature focuses on risk-adjusted returns, too. We therefore interpret the second hypothesis as a means of household smartness. The alternative is that "smart money" does not look at raw returns but at risk-adjusted performance. However, once adjusting for risk factors, we do not necessarily expect any signi…cant relation between alphas and sentiment.
Some authors regard fund ‡ows as another source or proxy of investor sentiment. However, the evidence 2 is mixed (Warther (1995) , Goetzmann et al. (2000) , Brown et al. (2005) , Baker and Wurgler (2007) , Ben-Rephael et al. (2011) ). All these studies di¤er substantially from ours as they use either shorter samples of daily data or aggregate fund ‡ows. However, in this study we deal with individual fund ‡ows which are used to construct fund investors' gained returns. The next section presents the data used to test these hypotheses.
IV. Data

U.S. Mutual Funds
Monthly mutual fund data is from Morningstar and free of survivorship bias. Since most studies on investor sentiment use U.S. domestic stocks only, we focus on funds investing into the same asset class and exclude industry focused funds 3 .
Morningstar introduced its classi…cation system in 1996, but back…lled it for nearly all 2 Goetzmann et al. (2000) use principal component analysis of daily U.S. mutual fund ‡ows, classi…ed according to eight major asset classes. Their …rst principal component has loadings which show a negative link between stock and bond fund ‡ows. The authors interprete this as investor sentiment (see also Brown et al. (2005) ). Ben-Rephael et al. (2011) investigate a proxy for monthly shifts between bond funds and equity funds. They …nd that this measure is negatively correlated with changes in the VIX and positively correlated with aggregate stock market excess returns. Warther (1995) , on the other hand, analyzes whether returns of small-cap stocks are more sensitive to in ‡ows than those of large-cap stock returns and if fund in ‡ows and the closed-end fund discount are related. He …nds no relation between aggregate fund ‡ows and sentiment. Baker and Wurgler (2007) use Principal Component Analysis for major equity and bond classes. They show that the second principal component of ‡ow changes has opposite loadings on speculative and safe funds ‡ows.funds in its database since then. Funds are categorized according to their average portfolio holdings over the past three years. For the main analysis, we use data at the portfolio level. 
(1 + r i;t ) and for months with distributions, Morningstar adds the distributions to cash ‡ows. Otherwise, it would be assumed that investors reinvest all their capital gains or dividends. As common, we compute the standardized percentage ‡ows as f low i;t = 100 CF i;t =T N A i;t 1 .
As a measure of risk, we use fund return volatility, which is the standard deviation of the past twelve return observations of each fund.
Investor Sentiment
We use the yearly investor sentiment index 5 of Baker and Wurgler (2006) . Unlike survey based 6 indices, the sentiment index uses market data or market related data only and tries to …nd the common signal in all those proxies. Using a composite index is advan-4 Due to data availability of monthly cash ‡ows and TNAs, our analysis starts in 1991:02 and ends in 2010:12 when building the portfolios described above. For the 1968:08 to 2010:10 period, 264 months were in high sentiment states and 245 months in low sentiment states. For the 1991:02 to 2010:12 subperiod, 108 months were in high sentiment states and 131 in low states. Note that our sample ends in 2010:12 because this is the last month for which the sentiment index is available. 5 We thank Je¤rey Wurgler for sharing his sentiment data. We obtained qualitatively similar results for both the monthly and yearly index, but present results for the yearly frequency because most authors use it.
6 De Bondt (1993) uses the Bull-Bear spread of the American Association of Individual Investor (AAII) survey, and Lee et al. (2002) use the survey index of Investors Intelligence (II) as a proxy for institutional sentiment, though the interaction between the two is not very clear. Lee et al. (2002) correctly state that newsletters which are being evaluated for the index of Investors Intelligence (II) are subsequently read by retail investors. Verma and Soydemir (2009) …nd that retail and institutional investors take opposite positions in sentiment. Besides, survey data can be prone to the subjectivity of e.g. the editor who reads and interprets newsletters. tageous as one has not to test several single variables against each other. Besides, it is possible to …lter out idiosyncratic noise and to …nd the common component behind all variables. The sentiment index (SENT) is the …rst principal component of six di¤erent variables which have been shown to measure investor sentiment, but with di¤erent timing. Variables which depend on investor demand might lead variables which depend on …rm supply decisions. Variables which depend on investor behavior include the average of …rst-day returns on IPOs (Ritter (1991) ), the closed-end fund discount (Lee et al. (1991) ), NYSE share turnover (Baker and Stein (2004) ), and the dividend premium, while the equity share in new issues (Baker and Wurgler (2000) ) and the number of IPOs (Ritter (1991) of distinguishing sentiment by this nonparametric approach of just two states is that results 7 Each of the sentiment proxies is …rst regressed on six macroeconomic variables which are growth in industrial production, real growth in durable, nondurable, and services consumption, growth in employment, and a dummy for NBER recessions. The residuals are then used to build the …rst principal component (SENT ? ). 8 Note that the closed-end fund discount, which is the average net asset value of closed-end equity fund shares minus the market prices of their underlying portfolios, and the dividend premium, de…ned as the log di¤erence of the average market-to-book ratios of dividend-paying and nonpaying stocks, are inversely related to sentiment.
should not be driven by speci…c values of sentiment variables.
V. Performance Measures
Researchers are puzzled why people keep investing in mutual funds, given that the average fund is shown to earn an annual Jensen's alpha somewhere between zero or slightly below (Jensen (1967) , Brown and Goetzmann (1995) , Schadt (1996), Carhart (1997) ).
However, traditional factor models fail to take the actual investment decisions into account.
Hence, we use fund investors' ‡ows as weights and compare di¤erent trading strategies and their resulting portfolios 9 of funds as in Gruber (1996) , Zheng (1999) , Sapp and Tiwari (2004) , or Keswani and Stolin (2008): 1. Equally weighted portfolio of all available funds. weights, hence they measure the return of fund investors who have just invested into a fund 9 Thoughout this paper, we follow the "portfolio regression approach" of Zheng (1999) . Note that she also presents another approach where risk adjusted returns are not calculated at the portfolio level but the individual fund level and then aggregated. This "fund regression approach" can also be found in Gruber (1996) and Keswani and Stolin (2008) , while the "portfolio regression approach" can be found in Sapp and Tiwari (2004), too. 10 Note that we do not use the contemporaneous ‡ows as weights because fund investors could observe the within month performance of funds. over the next period. Portfolios 3 and 5 are based on negative ‡ow weights, and measure the return of funds which have been sold previously. For each portfolio, we use the resulting time series to compare di¤erent performance measures like the excess return over the market, r p;t M KT t , where M KT t is the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. Besides this, we estimate the Fama-French three factor model together with the momentum factor of Carhart (1997) . As in Stambaugh et al. (2012) , we estimate:
where following the usual convention the monthly excess return of portfolio p over the risk-free rate, i.e. the 1-month T-Bill return, is denoted by r p;t r f;t , and the excess return on the market minus the risk-free rate is denoted by M KT RF . All fund returns are net of expenses. The average return on the three small minus the average return on the three big market capitalization portfolios is denoted by SM B (Small Minus Big) and HM L is the average return on two value minus the average return on the two growth portfolios as in Fama and French (1993) . Carhart's M OM is the average of the returns on two (big and small) high prior return portfolios minus the average of the returns on two low prior return portfolios where prior returns are measured from month t 12 to t 2 (Carhart (1997) ).
We do not use three factors only because Sapp and Tiwari (2004) show that momentum explains the smart money e¤ect in their quarterly data sample. Keswani and Stolin (2008) on the other hand …nd that this is not true for their monthly sample. 
VI. Results
Autocorrelation of Returns and Summary Statistics
Our hypotheses rely on changing states of sentiment. The second column presents the one month autocorrelation of stock market excess returns in low and high sentiment periods, denoted by (1). Interestingly, the autocorrelation is at zero when sentiment is low but signi…cant at 0.13 when sentiment is high, although the di¤erence is not signi…cant with a t-value of 1.13. If arbitrageurs do not drive prices back to fundamentals, market returns should be less independent over time when sentiment is high, for which we …nd evidence. The second column of panels C and D shows that similar results are obtained for the excess returns of equity funds. For our entire sample period the one month autocorrelation of fund excess returns is at 0.16 and signi…cant when sentiment is high while at only 0.07 and insigni…cant when sentiment is low. The di¤erence between both means is not statistically di¤erent either. Hence, this can only be regarded as a quick test of market e¢ ciency to motivate our study. Still, to our best knowledge this …nding in conjunction with investor sentiment has not been documented before.
Expected Returns of Portfolio Sorts
To check for pattern in the cross-section of funds'risks and returns, we rank funds each month into …ve quintiles according to their return standard deviation over the prior twelve months. The …rst row of Panel A in In summary, there is strong evidence for hypothesis one: When sentiment is high, riskier funds do not return more than safer funds. The e¤ects are of high economical signi…cance, and robust to di¤erent sample periods. One might argue that this …nding seems natural
given that the market return in excess of the riskfree rate is of only -39 bps and insigni…cant when sentiment is high but in that case one would rather expect a reverse relation in the cross-section, i.e. that the riskiest funds earn less than the safest funds. We …nd however that the risk-expected return relation is essentially ‡at when sentiment is high, not reversed.
Testing the Market Risk Premium
Since there exist di¤erent notions of risk than our employed total risk, we sort equity funds each month into quintiles by their systematic risk to ensure that our results so far were not driven by idiosyncratic risk. For each fund i at time t, we estimate the four factor model r i;t r f; 
and the expected returns are linear in the betas
r t is our 5 1 vector of excess returns or test assets, F t is a 4 1 vector of factors, B a 5 4 matrix of betas, and F is the vector of factor risk premia
As factors we simply use the three Fama French and a momentum factor as before 12 . A straightforward approach to test whether market risk is priced (i.e. whether M KT RF 6 = 0)
would be to use Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. The problem with this procedure is that estimated regressors (e.g. the^ 1 i ) are used in cross-sectional regressions of equation (4), thus leading to error-in-variables bias. We avoid this problem by estimating the risk premia of F using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982) . Let b be the vector of unknown parameters F ;and B. Let E T be the sample mean E T = (1=T ) P T t=1 and the sample moments be g t (b) =E T [u t (b)] ;where u t (b) are the pricing errors. The GMM estimator of b then minimizes the weighted sum of squared pricing errors g t (b)
where W is a weighting matrix. In particular, we …rst use the identity matrix to start with W = I and then use the optimal weighting matrix W =Ŝ 1 where S is the spectral density matrix of u t ; S = P 1 j= 1 E[u t u of b from the …rst optimization. Intuitively, this means that assets which moment conditions have a higher variance will get smaller weights and thus the second stage estimator is e¢ cient (Cochrane (1996) 
Cash ‡ow Weighted Portfolio Results
In this section, we analyze the performance of equity fund investors, and whether it is related to the state of sentiment. Panel D in table 1 shows that the average monthly ‡ow to equity funds is of 80 bps in low and 63 bps in high sentiment periods. This di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant. We proceed by using the ‡ow portfolios.
Excess Equity Fund Returns
We present results for the ‡ow weighted portfolio or trading strategies conditioned on sentiment. Table 6 panel A shows portfolio returns in excess of the market return when sentiment is positive or high, and panel B shows results when sentiment is negative or low.
Each parameter has its t-value below in parentheses. We test for equality of the average excess return of the average fund and the excess return of the ‡ow weighted portfolios and present the t-test statistic in brackets. Besides, we test if the excess returns are equal in low and high sentiment periods and present this t-test statistic in angle brackets.
Panel A shows that when sentiment is high, all equity funds earn zero returns in excess of the market, while the group of the riskiest funds even underperform it by -17 bps per month, though this is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Turning to equally weighted portfolios with positive ‡ows below, we …nd that safest funds outperform the market by 16 bps per month although the parameter itself is not signi…cant. In one out of …ve cases, the t-test statistic in brackets is signi…cant pointing that the purchase based portfolio outperforms the average mutual fund. This relation is monotonically decreasing in market risk, but not statistically di¤erent (the t-value is at -1.14). The ‡ow weighted portfolios show only weak evidence of any "smart money" e¤ects because none of the parameters is signi…cant. On the other hand, it shows no clear underperformance either.
As mentioned above, we do not hypothesize any special investor skill when market risk is priced during low sentiment periods. Results in the upper part of table 6 panel B seem not surprising given that they are similar to those in panel B of table 2 except that they are in excess of the market: Safer funds (quintiles 1, 2 and 3) underperform the market when sentiment is low while the riskiest funds outperform the market, though the latter …nding is not statistically signi…cant. Still, the di¤erence between the riskiest and the safest funds is signi…cant at 40 bps per month. Here, we …nd more evidence for the "smart money" e¤ect. As indicated by the signi…cant t-values in brackets, we …nd that all the equally weighted portfolios with positive (negative) ‡ows outperform (underperform) the average mutual fund. For example, investors sell the riskiest funds which subsequently underperform by -31 bps per month or 3.72 percent per year. For the ‡ow weighted portfolio with negative ‡ows we get similar results, but somehow weaker. Interestingly, the group of safest funds is the only quintile which has a signi…cantly di¤erent excess return in low and high sentiment periods as indicated by its t-value at 2.26 or 1.99 in angle brackets. Thus, there is some evidence that fund investors are "smart" for both buy and sell-based portfolios which is mostly concentrated on least risky funds. Interestingly, this happens independently of the state of sentiment, the excess returns earned however are signi…cantly di¤erent from each other. Note that although investors are able to beat the average mutual fund, they still earn zero or negative excess returns when sentiment is low. The e¤ects we observe are strongest for the sell-based portfolios 3 and 5 of safest funds. This speaks against hypothesis two since there are no pattern that investors shift their money from riskiest into least risky funds. Our key …nding is thus that "smart money" is active in the group of least risky funds independent of the state of sentiment.
Risk-adjusted Fund Returns
We turn to results of alpha performance. The table 7 shows results of equation (1).
Each parameter has its t-value below in parentheses. Similar as before, we test for equality of the average alpha of the average fund and the alpha of the ‡ow weighted portfolios and present the t-test statistic in brackets. We test if the alphas are equal in low and high sentiment periods and present the t-test statistic in angle brackets. None of the t-tests in angle brackets is signi…cant. The equity fund alphas thus do not show the same pattern of the excess fund returns as they are adjusted for market risk now, and for the sake of brevity we report alphas for the full sample only. As before, the safest funds of quintile 1 have the strongest e¤ects. Purchase-based portfolio 4 outperforms the average mutual fund while sell-based portfolios 3 and 5 underperform it. Thus, although sentiment leads to di¤erent return pattern depending on being low or high they disappear once controlling for other risk factors. Still, there are cross-sectional di¤erences. Table 8 shows that a trading strategy long the ‡ow-weighted purchase-based portfolio and short the sell-based portfolio has a monthly alpha of 31 bps or annualized 3.72 percent. The question arises whether this is economically signi…cant or not. Sapp and Tiwari (2004) …nd a statistically signi…cant alpha of 7.1 bps per month for their positive ‡ow portfolio and interpret its as evidence for "smart money". In that respect, our alphas are much higher. In unreported results, we form portfolios on SMB, HML and MOM loadings, as well as on combinations of them but do not …nd any pattern.
Characteristics of MKTRF Funds
As mentioned earlier, Zheng (1999) …nds that "smart money" e¤ects are strongest for smaller funds. Since mutual funds have decreasing returns to scale (Berk and Green (2004) ), smaller funds might employ trading strategies which lead to low market betas. As a consequence, our results could be explained by the possible correlation of market beta and fund size. We perform sorts on MKTRF betas and report the average TNA of each quintile in the …rst row of table 9. Clearly, our results seem not to be driven by the fund size e¤ect of Zheng (1999) . The low beta funds of quintile 1 have an average monthly TNA which is 256
Mio $U.S. larger than that of quintile 5.
Since some of our portfolios use fund ‡ows as weights it could be important to check the ‡ows for patterns. This seems important since the smart money e¤ects we document for the group of safest funds could be caused by very small ‡ows. The second row shows that this is not the case. Of all quintiles, the …rst one has the largest average ‡ow.
The third row shows the average turnover 13 of funds. Low beta funds of quintile 1 trade 39 percent less than high beta funds of quintile 5, which is a substantial di¤erence.
Interestingly, turnover is monotonically increasing with market beta. If low beta funds trade much less, their expenses could be lower, too. However, this is not the case. The market beta-expense ratio 14 relation is U-shaped as can be seen in row four. Although quintile 1 funds charge 5 bps less than the ones of quintile 5, the di¤erence is of low economical importance.
One might object that using single sorts by market betas does not allow to detect we compute the standard deviation of the quintile rank using the last 36 months of data of the SMB, HML and MOM loadings. Thus, if a fund switches e.g. its exposure from large-to small-cap stocks over time as detected by its time-varying SMB beta of equation (2), its rank changes from quintile 5 to quintile 1, and the standard deviation of the rank will be larger than that of a fund which stays in large-cap stocks. The RSV measure is simply de…ned as the average of all three rank standard deviations, RSV = (
The last row of shows that the safest and riskiest funds have the highest values for RSV, but the di¤erence among both quintiles seems not economically signi…cant given that the di¤erence in RSV to all other quintiles is larger. 13 The turnover ratio measures the trading activities of a fund, calculated as the lesser of purchases or sales divided by average monthly TNA.
14 The expense ratio is the percentage of fund assets deducted for operating expenses like management fees, administrative fees 12b-1 fees and operating costs. Not included are the fund's brokerage costs or any load charges.
Summary
In summary, we …nd strong evidence for hypotheses one and three but not for hypothesis two. When sentiment is high, riskier funds do not o¤er a risk premium, but there are no signs that investors shift their money from the riskiest to the safest funds. We detect "smart money" e¤ects for both the purchase-based and sell-based portfolios of safest funds independent of the state of sentiment and these e¤ects are economically strong. When we control for other risk factors there are no alpha di¤erences between low and high sentiment periods, but the group of safest funds still shows signi…cant alphas. Thus, it seems that "smart money" is not misled by cross-sectional di¤erences in fund returns caused by di¤erent sentiment states.
Instead, "smart money" seems to be interested in obtaining the highest Sharpe ratios possible. Subtracting the average riskfree rate which is of 45 bps for the full sample (28 bps for the ‡ow subsample of panel B) from each quintile return in table 2 and dividing it by the respective standard deviation below shows that the group of safest funds has at all times the highest of all Sharpe ratios. Our results are in line with Grinblatt et al. (2011) who show that investors with higher IQs are more likely to hold mutual funds, have lower-beta portfolios than lower-IQ participants and earn higher Sharpe ratios.
Further Robustness Checks
Instead of ranking funds each month, we ranked them at the beginning of each year, also. This is important because the monthly rebalancing is a contrarian strategy 15 that exploits reversal, which in turn can cause higher performance of the equal-weighted portfolio (Plyakha et al. (2012) ). Our results however remained unchanged.
Our sorts rely on historical beta loadings or historical standard deviation. We model each fund return as a GARCH (1,1) process and use the monthly volatility in our quintile ranks. Since many investors might be concerned if their fund does not track its benchmark, we compute the tracking error 16 of each fund and use it in our sorts, too. Neither the use of 15 We are thankful for this comment. 16 The tracking error variable is the twelve month rolling standard deviation of the di¤erence between a the GARCH(1,1) nor the use of tracking error did change our results.
For robustness, we tried di¤erent speci…cations for equations (1) where the betas were allowed to have two states, too (Ferson and Schadt (1996) ). Ferson et al. (2008) show that suppressing time-variation in betas causes the conditional alpha to be biased. Using simulations, Jha et al. (2009) argue that their conditional investment opportunity set measure 17 which employs time-variation in alpha only is less biased than the conditional alpha measure of Ferson and Schadt (1996) . Our results remained qualitatively unchanged when trying all these models.
We estimate equation (1) with the traded liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) .
Since most of our alphas change slightly, e.g. often by only one basis point, we report results without the liquidity factor.
The ‡ow portfolios measure the return or alpha earned over the subsequent month. We analyze longer holding periods up to 36 months but do not …nd any pattern for the MKTRF betas sorted funds. Hence, it seems that the "smart money" e¤ects we …nd are short-lived.
All of our robustness checks are available as tables upon request.
fund's return and its benchmark. Although a fund might choose a benchmark which can easily be beaten, or in reality track another benchmark, the tracking error might still matter as it is published and advertised by funds in order to attract new investors'money. 17 Note that the Jha et al. (2009) conditional alpha performance measure has been applied with the sentiment index in levels as an instrument in Berger and Turtle (2012) .
VII. Conclusion
In this study, we …nd that market risk of U.S. mutual funds is only priced when sentiment is low. When sentiment is high, the risk premium is insigni…cant. We then investigate the cross-sectional pattern in U.S. fund investors' performance conditioned on high and low sentiment. We …nd evidence for "smart money" e¤ects for purchase and sell-based portfolios of funds with lowest riskiness independent of the state of sentiment, although the market excess returns are di¤erent. These e¤ects exist for both purchase-and sell-based portfolios.
Although investors buy funds which perform better than the average mutual fund when sentiment is low, they still earn negative returns in excess of the market. Once controlling for other risk factors, the alpha di¤erences between low and high sentiment periods disappear.
"Smart money" e¤ects are still observable for the group of safest funds, and the four-factor alpha is economically large at 3.72 percent per year.
Interestingly, we …nd that results are strongest for the extreme quintile of the safest funds. This is in line with Grinblatt et al. (2011) who show that di¤erences in investors'IQ, and not only wealth or risk aversion, lead investors to hold di¤erent portfolios. If investors'
IQs and "smartness" are correlated, we would expect "smart" investors to hold portfolios or mutual funds which o¤er the best risk-expected return tradeo¤ or Sharpe ratios. We …nd that "smart money" follows the funds with the highest Sharpe ratios and seems to understand that risk-adjusted performance measures are robust to the cross-sectional pattern in fund returns caused by di¤erent sentiment states. Rows corresponding to "high=low" have a test of equality between high and low sentiment periods. All variables are as de…ned in the data section. Every parameter estimate is followed by its t-statistic which has been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to the method of Newey and West (1987) using four lags. *** denotes signi…cance at the 1 percent, ** at the 5 percent and * at the 10 percent level. This table shows time series averages of cross-sectional averages of equity fund returns in panels A and return standard deviation in panel B from 1965:08 to 2010:12 and from 1991:02 to 2010:12 in panels C and D. We rank funds each month into …ve quintiles according to their risk variable which is the return standard deviation over the prior twelve months. Quintile 1 has the safest funds and quintile 5 has the riskiest funds. The column denoted quintile 5-1 shows return and risk di¤erences between quintile 5 and 1. The …rst column indicates if the sentiment state is low or high. Rows corresponding to "high-low" display return and risk di¤erences between high and low sentiment periods, followed by a test of equality. All variables are as de…ned in the data section. Every parameter estimate is followed by its t-statistic which has been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to the method of Newey and West (1987) using four lags. *** denotes signi…cance at the 1 percent, ** at the 5 percent and * at the 10 percent level. We rank funds each month into …ve quintiles according to the historical beta over the prior 36 months. Quintile 1 has the low beta funds and quintile 5 has the high beta funds. The column denoted quintile 5-1 shows return and risk di¤erences between quintile 5 and 1. The …rst column indicates if the sentiment state is low or high. Rows corresponding to "high-low" display return and beta di¤erences between high and low sentiment periods, followed by a test of equality. All variables are as de…ned in the data section. Every parameter estimate is followed by its t-statistic which has been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to the method of Newey and West (1987) using four lags. *** denotes signi…cance at the 1 percent, ** at the 5 percent and * at the 10 percent level. We rank funds each month into …ve quintiles according to the historical beta over the prior 36 months. Quintile 1 has the low beta funds and quintile 5 has the high beta funds. The column denoted quintile 5-1 shows return and beta di¤erences between quintile 5 and 1. The …rst column indicates if the sentiment state is low or high. Rows corresponding to "high-low" display return and beta di¤erences between high and low sentiment periods, followed by a test of equality. All variables are as de…ned in the data section. Every parameter estimate is followed by its t-statistic which has been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to the method of Newey and West (1987) using four lags. *** denotes signi…cance at the 1 percent, ** at the 5 percent and * at the 10 percent level. (2). Quintile 1 has the safest funds and quintile 5 has the riskiest funds. In addition to each parameter and its t-value in parenthesis below, we test for equality of the average exress return of portfolio 1 and the excess return of the particular portfolio and present the t-value in brackets. Besides, we test if the excess returns are equal in low and high sentiment periods and present this t-test statistic in angle brackets. All variables are as de…ned in the data section. Test statistics have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to the method of Newey and West (1987) using four lags. *** denotes signi…cance at the 1 percent, ** at the 5 percent and * at the 10 percent level. This table shows four factor alphas for the ‡ow portfolios of equity funds from 1991:02 to 2010:12. We rank funds each month into …ve quintiles according to their historical market beta estimated by equation (2). Quintile 1 has the safest funds and quintile 5 has the riskiest funds. In addition to each parameter and its t-value in parenthesis below, we test for equality of the average alpha of portfolio 1 and the alpha of the particular portfolio and present the t-value in brackets. All variables are as de…ned in the data section. Test statistics have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to the method of Newey and West (1987) using four lags. *** denotes signi…cance at the 1 percent, ** at the 5 percent and * at the 10 percent level. This table shows equity funds alpha di¤erences between positive and negative ‡ow portfolios from 1991:02 to 2010:12. We rank funds each month into …ve quintiles according to their historical market beta estimated by equation (2). Quintile 1 has the safest funds and quintile 5 has the riskiest funds. We test if the alphas are equal in low and high sentiment periods and present the t-test statistic in angle brackets. A trading strategy long in positive ‡ow portfolio 4 and short in negative ‡ow portfolio 5 which are both ‡ow weighted is denoted by "Flow weighted portfolio with positive ‡ows-negative ‡ows". All variables are as de…ned in the data section. Test statistics have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to the method of Newey and West (1987) using four lags. *** denotes signi…cance at the 1 percent, ** at the 5 percent and * at the 10 percent level. This table shows characteristics of funds. We rank funds each month into …ve quintiles according to their historical market beta estimated by equation (2). Quintile 1 has the safest funds and quintile 5 has the riskiest funds. All variables are as de…ned in the data section. Test statistics have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to the method of Newey and West (1987) using four lags. *** denotes signi…cance at the 1 percent, ** at the 5 percent and * at the 10 percent level. It is the …rst principal component of six sentiment proxies which have been orthogonalized with respect to six macroeconomic variables. In a …rst step, the average of lagged …rst-day returns on IPOs, the closed-end fund discount, lagged NYSE share turnover, lagged dividend pre-mium, the equity share in new issues and the number of IPOs are regressed on growth in industrial production, real growth in durable, nondurable, and services consumption, growth in employment, and a dummy for NBER recessions. In a second step, the residuals of each regression are used in principal component analysis. Morningstar reports its data at the shareclass level. We transform returns and other variables from the shareclass to the portfolio level, i.e. we calculate the fund portfolio return (cash ‡ow,expense ratio) from the corresponding shareclass returns (cash ‡ow,expense ratio) weighted by their total net assets (TNA). The portfolio TNA are the sum of individual shareclass TNA. A rigorous check is applied to data to test for double entries. While return data has the fewest (only four) double entries, some other variables have more double entries, but still in modest proportion. Whenever an observation exists more than once, only one observation is kept if they are completely equal. In case of nonequal observations for the same point in time, all corresponding observations are deleted. It has become practice to exclude funds if they are too small (Chevalier (1997) ). We delete funds with less than 1 Mio $U.S. of TNA. Some studies delete funds with less than 10 Mio $U.S. of TNA, but we would lose 38% of all observations if we did so. When sorting on TNA, our lowest quintiles has an average monthly TNA of 24 Mio $U.S., which is very similar to that of the second quintile of Chen et al. (2004) . Besides, latter authors show that even smaller funds do not drive results in their study. Since the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) is available from 1965:8 onwards, our …nal sample starts at the same month and ends in 2010:12, which yields 545 months. As the rolling betas estimation needs at least 36 monthly observations, we delete all funds which have less than three years of return data. To ensure that outliers do not in ‡uence results, we winsorize all explanatory fund variables at the bottom and top 0.5 percent. As this does not change anything, we report the non-winsorized results.
